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Abstract
As an emerging technique, cooperative device to device (CD2D) communication has been considered to be a solution
to capacity shortage problem. Combining multi-homing and CD2D techniques together can potentially improve network
performance. We propose a novel multi-homing CD2D (MH-CD2D) network, in which multiple homing mobile devices
(MMDs) act as relays for the cooperative communications of ordinary mobile devices (OMDs). We formulate such joint
bandwidth-relay allocation problem as a two-stage game, in order to deal with two challenges: 1) how to design incentive
mechanisms motivating MMDs to lease spare bandwidths to OMDs; 2) how to help OMDs to choose appropriate MMD
relays. In the first stage, we use a non-cooperative game to model the competition between MMDs in terms of shared
bandwidth and price. In the second stage, we model the behavior of OMDs selecting MMDs by an evolutionary game.
We prove that there exists Nash equilibrium in the game and propose a distributed incentive scheme named IMES to solve
the joint bandwidth-relay allocation problem. Extensive simulation results show that the equilibrium can be achieved and
the best response price of one MMD increases with the other’s best price in the Stackelberg game. The utility of MMDs
increases with the number of OMDs in each OMD group at the evolutionary equilibrium. The proposed algorithms are
able to reduce average service delay by more than 25% in comparison to the randomized scheme which is frequently
used in the most existing works. On average, IMES outperforms existing scheme by about 20.37% in terms of utility of
MMDs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of various wireless devices and numerous mobile applications, there is a tremendous
growth on user demands for high data rates of wireless networks. Device-to-Device (D2D) communication [1]
as an emerging communication technology is of great potential to alleviate this capacity-shortage problem by
offloading traffic from base stations. Besides, cooperative communication [2] is another new type of wireless
communication technology, in which devices can help each other to relay information and consequently improve
the spatial diversity. As a result, the network capacity can be enhanced. The integration of D2D communications
and cooperative communications can better improve the network capacity. Recently, it is shown in [3] and [4]
that cooperative D2D (CD2D) communications can improve the performance of both D2D communications and
the infrastructure communications at base stations. However, most of current studies on D2D communications,
cooperative communications and CD2D communications only consider (i) homogeneous network settings and
(ii) associations of devices to a single network. Both considerations (i) and (ii) are neither practical nor
applicable to the heterogeneous and multi-accessing features of next generation networks [5] [6].
Instead of associating to a single network, a device with multi-homing capability can maintain multiple simul-
taneous associations to several different wireless networks [7]. The multi-homing communication technology
has the following advantages: (1) supporting applications with high data rate demands by aggregating bandwidth
resources from multiple access networks; (2) being capable to relay information across different networks with
the mobility of devices. Essentially, the multi-homing technology is mainly designed for heterogeneous networks
[8] since devices with multi-homing capability shall be able to travel across different access networks.
Using multi-homing technology in CD2D networks can potentially improve the network performance further.
Therefore, we propose a novel network architecture that integrates both the two technologies. We name such
multi-homing CD2D networks as MH-CD2D networks. In this new network architecture, we need to solve the
following research challenges:
• Challenge I. From the perspective of MMDs, serving more OMDs means more energy consumption. To
save energy, some selfish MMDs may decline to relay information. Essentially, we shall design appropriate
incentive mechanisms to motivate MMDs to make their contributions. For example, each OMD must pay
for the service offered by the corresponding MMD.
• Challenge II. MMDs may compete with each other for earning more profits from OMDs. However,
competitions between MMDs can also cause utility losses for MMDs when charging price becomes lower
3and lower. Therefore, we shall coordinate bandwidth leases of MMDs.
• Challenge III. As the number of OMDs is usually larger than that of MMDs, every source node (OMD)
always wants to choose the best relay to maximize the performance. The inefficient selection of relays may
lead to the network congestion and consequently degrades the performance of CD2D communications.
Therefore, an efficient bandwidth allocation and relay selection mechanism shall be designed in our MH-
CD2D networks.
Recently, an interesting work was proposed in [9] focusing on mode selection, but only working for two types
of networks, i.e. WLANs and LTE-A cellular networks. Some significant works [10]–[14] focus on bandwidth
allocation or relay selection in CD2D networks by assuming that relays are willing to cooperate. The incentive
schemes presented in [15] and [16] utilize evolutionary game to allocate radio spectrum resources without
considering relay influence. It is observed that, multiple networks are not considered in [9] and incentive
mechanisms are not addressed in [9]–[14]. Moreover, spatial diversity is not included in [15] and [16]. This
motivates us to design an incentive mechanism that combines multiple homing and cooperative communication
techniques to solve the above mentioned challenges. This paper is distinct from our previous work [17] in many
aspects. Firstly, our work [17] has been significantly extended by adding investigations for the best strategies
of pricing and bandwidth allocation on both MMDs, together with comparisons between proposed algorithm
and randomized scheme in terms of service delay. Moreover, the relationship between average service delay
and the number of OMDs is analyzed in this paper. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• We formally identify an MH-CD2D network architecture that characterizes the features of multi-homing
capability and cooperative communications. The incentive mechanism for bandwidth allocation and relay
selection in MH-CD2D networks has not been investigated before.
• We model the joint bandwidth-relay allocation problem in MH-CD2D networks as a two-stage game which
consists of two sub-games, (A) a non-cooperative game among MMDs; (B) an evolutionary game among
OMDs. Sub-game (A) is the leader and sub-game (B) is the follower.
• To solve the aforementioned challenges (Challenges I, II, III), we propose a distributed scheme named
incentive mechanism for efficient bandwidth relay sharing (IMES) in MH-CD2D networks. We also show
that IMES converges fast and it is efficient for resource sharing in MH-CD2D networks.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to investigate price competition between MMDs.
Extensive simulation results show that, the average service delay can be reduced by more than 25% in
comparison to the randomized scheme which is frequently used in the most existing works. On average,
IMES outperforms existing combinatorial double auction resource allocation (CDARA) scheme [18] by
4about 20.37% in terms of utility of MMDs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our new architecture and presents basic
assumptions. Section III gives a brief review of related works on both non-incentive based and incentive
based resource allocation schemes. In Section IV, we describe network model and define resource allocation
problem. Section V formulates the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. We then propose the distributed
IMES scheme in Section VI. Section VII presents the performance evaluation results and finally Section VIII
concludes this paper.
II. A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR COOPERATIVE D2D COMMUNICATION
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Fig. 1. An example of MH-CD2D network architecture
In this architecture, some mobile devices can be associated to multiple heterogeneous networks and others
can only be associated to a single network, which has following characteristics.
• There are two kinds of devices in MH-CD2D networks: (1) ordinary mobile devices (OMDs) and (2) multi-
homing mobile devices (MMDs). OMDs are only associated to a single network or can communicate with
one source node and MMDs can be associated to multiple networks. Besides, MMDs can travel across
different networks while OMDs cannot1.
• MH-CD2D networks consist of multiple heterogeneous networks with different coverage area and different
bandwidth settings.
• There are two kinds of communications in MH-CD2D networks: (i) infrastructure communications and
(ii) D2D communications. In infrastructure communications, both OMDs and MMDs can communicate
with base stations or APs directly. In D2D communications, OMDs and MMDs can directly communicate
with each other.
1This assumption is reasonable because we consider each OMD is equipped with a half duplex antenna and a single network interface due to
constrained economic budget.
5Fig. 1 shows an example of our MH-CD2D networks, which consists of macro cellular networks, small
cellular networks, femto cellular networks and WLANs. In each network, both OMDs and MMDs can com-
municate with their associated base stations through infrastructure communications. For example, as shown
in Fig. 1, OMDs O11, O7 and an MMD M4 can communicate with their associated macro base station, i.e.,
(MBS2) via infrastructure communications. Different from an OMD, an MMD can be associated with more
than one network. For example, an MMD M5 can be associated with MBS1 and WiFi AP2 simultaneously. In
addition to infrastructure communications between devices and base stations, there are D2D communications in
our MH-CD2D networks. Take Fig. 1 as an example again. OMDs O3 and O5 can directly communicate with
each other and an OMD O4 can communicate with an MMD M7 in D2D mode. Besides, MMDs can travel
across different networks. For example, M3 can move from a macro cellular network to another small cellular
network (the new position is denoted by M
′
3 and the moving direction is indicated by the dash arrow). Note that
there are usually more OMDs than MMDs in our MH-CD2D networks because an MMD with multi-homing
capability (e.g., equipped with multiple communication modules [6]) is more expensive than an OMD.
In this paper, we investigate cooperative communications in MH-CD2D networks to improve the network
performance. We choose MMDs as relaying nodes instead of OMDs because: (1) MMDs can aggregate
bandwidth resources from multiple access networks; (2) MMDs can help to relay information across different
networks by exploiting multi-homing mobility of MMDs; (3) the case of choosing OMDs as cooperative relays
can be regarded as a special case of our analysis.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly survey related studies on the joint bandwidth-relay allocation in cooperative
communications, D2D communications and CD2D communications.
A. Non-Incentive-Based Schemes
There are many approaches proposed to improve capacity of the wireless network. Cooperative communi-
cation [2] [19] has received extensive attentions recently since it can boost the capacity by exploiting spatial
diversity with multiple relaying nodes. Besides, D2D communications can significantly enhance the capacity
by establishing a path between two wireless devices directly without going through the infrastructure of a base
station or an access point. It is shown in [3] and [4] that integrating both cooperative communications and D2D
communications together can improve the capacity further. We call such cooperative D2D communications as
CD2D communications.
One of the key issues in CD2D communications is the joint bandwidth-relay allocation problem. However,
many of current studies address bandwidth (spectrum) allocation or relay allocation separately. For example,
6Cao et al. [10] provided a spectrum sharing framework between cellular users and D2D users in the up-
link channel. An auction based relay allocation and sharing scheme was proposed by Chen et al. [12] where
cellular users helped the transmission of D2D pairs. In [20], a relay based MIMO transmission with interference
mitigation scheme was proposed for D2D communications. Multi-relay diversity was proposed by Lv et al.
[21] and round-robin based relay sharing was investigated in [22].
The joint bandwidth-relay allocation in CD2D communications has attracted extensive attentions recently
since it can fully utilize the resource and better improve the performance. Li and Guo [11] formulated the joint
problem as a mixed-integer non-linear programming and a centralized coding-based algorithm was employed
to achieve high max-min transmission rate. In [13], Li et al. proposed a fine grained resource allocation scheme
with CD2D communication in cellular networks. Zhao et al. [14] investigated a coding scheme to maximize
total transmission rate in CD2D transmissions. However, most of those studies only consider an idealistic
scenario, in which relay nodes are always willing to serve. It is impractical in real life as most mobile nodes
are resource-constrained (e.g., power-constrained). Serving other nodes will result in the increase of self energy
cost. Besides, most of the above studies fail to consider the heterogeneity of mobile nodes as all nodes are
regarded as homogeneous.
B. Incentive-Based Schemes
There are some incentive-based mechanisms proposed for relay allocation in cooperative communication
network [23]–[25]. Yang et al. [23] designed a McAfee based truthful double auction scheme for cooperative
communications, but one relay can only serve one source node. Besides, Wang et al. [24] presented a Stackelberg
game for joint relay selection and power control, but they employed only one source-destination pair, which
cannot be applied to our MH-CD2D networks where multiple MMDs act as relays. Although there were
multiple source-destination pairs sharing one particular relay in [25], it is not suitable for multiple relays’
scenario. Other auction schemes for spectrum sharing can refer to [26]. Most of those studies do not consider
relay competitions.
As an efficient resource allocation methodology, Game theory [27] has shown its advantages in providing
incentives for network users to participate in resource allocation of wireless networks. Niyato and Hossain [15]
firstly modeled the competitions among users in different areas as an evolutionary game, which was further
extended to model the price competitions between primary users in a cognitive radio network in [16]. However,
both [15] and [16] failed to utilize cooperative spectrum diversity, which can significantly improve the capacity
[2]. Wang et al. [28] addressed the joint relay and spectrum allocation using auction theory and Li et al.
[29] studied the coalitional game for spectrum access in cognitive radio networks while both of them did not
7TABLE I. Basic Notations for System Model
Notations Meaning
R The set of active relay MMDs
M Total number of MMDs
ri The i-th element of set R
m The total number of active MMDs, m =
|R|,m ≤M
N The set of active OMDs, n = |N |, n ≤ N
n
g
i Number of OMDs in community g that is at-
tached to relay ri
ωi Total bandwidth that MMD relay ri is willing to
lease
ni Total number of OMDs that choose to associate
with MMD ri
Si The set of OMDs that choose MMD ri
sij The jth OMD that chooses relay ri, j ∈ [1, ni]
P Charging price vector of all MMDs
pri Charging price of the ith MMD, i ∈ [1,m]
Ω The bandwidth vector that the MMDs are willing
to share
dij The destination node of source node sij
Psij Transmission power of source node sij
Pri Transmission power of relay node ri
CD The achievable capacity between source sij and
destination dij
CR The achievable capacity between sij and dij with
cooperative relay ri
u
g
ij Utility of the jth source sij renting MMD ri
Ui Utility of the ith MMD relay ri
u¯g Average utility of a user in group g
pi
g
i Fraction of sharing for relay ri,
∑
i pi
g
i = 1, pi
g
i ≥
0
consider relay competitions. Recently, Yun et al. [30] proposed a Stackelberg game-based scheme to tackle the
network radio bandwidth allocation problem for multi-homing devices. However, they failed to address price
competitions and the scenario in this paper is distinct from that in [30]. In summary, those game-theoretical
solutions can not be applied to our MH-CD2D networks since they considered neither MMD competitions nor
cooperative spectrum diversity. Therefore, it is the goal of this paper to address the above issues.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the overlay paradigm for the spectrum allocation between D2D communications and infras-
tructure communications, where the mutual interferences between the two types of communications can be
ignored [31]. Besides, mode selection in MH-CD2D networks is not considered since we mainly concentrate
on the design of incentive mechanisms. We assume that the spectrum owned by MMDs is coordinated by
8network service providers, i.e. base stations using OFDMA [10] or TDMA [32] [33] so that interferences
among MMDs and interferences within OMD communities can be mitigated. Meanwhile, by adopting network
coding schemes [34], we can properly handle the inter-relay interference. In the network, we assume that nodes
do not frequently move or move slowly, similar to that in [35]. This work focuses on the type of static cases
of nodes, rather than on the cases with different mobility patterns, such as random walk, hot spot mobility,
route mobility models etc. [36], although the mobility of nodes is one of the most important research cases.
For cost efficient location update and paging management in personal communication service networks, one
may refer to the analysis performed by Li et al. [37] [38]. For throughput-delay-mobility tradeoff study under
a more practical restricted random mobility model, one may refer to [39]. Basic notations are summarized in
Table I.
There are M MMDs and N OMDs in an MH-CD2D network. We use R = {r1, r2, · · · , rm} to denote
the set of active relaying MMDs and N = {1, 2, · · · , n} to denote the set of active OMDs, where |R| ≤ M
and |N | ≤ N . Since both MMDs and OMDs are carried by mobile users who may have common interests
using social applications, such as watching videos or browsing pictures, each OMD may choose to associate
with multiple MMDs sharing common interests. Note that at the same time, one OMD can only be served by
one MMD. That’s because each OMD can only communicate with one MMD at a time with a half-duplex
communication module. Differently, each MMD is equipped with multiple antennas, which allows the MMD
associating with multiple networks. Generally, an MMD may not always be busy transmitting in high data rate
(e.g., video streaming). Sometimes, it performs low data rate communication (e.g., sending short messages)
and only occupies a small portion of the total spectrum. In particular, an MMD can lease unused spectrum
to OMDs within its community so that it can make profits while OMDs can utilize the leased spectrum via
spectrum aggregation [40] offered by the MMDs.
We name the OMDs associating an MMD as a community or a group interchangeably throughout this
paper. Each community forms a cluster where the OMDs can share the spectrum and cooperative transmission
opportunity of their associated MMD. It is worth mentioning that OMDs in one community can also associate
with other communities, but can only be attached to one community at a time due to the half-duplexity of OMDs.
In particular, we divide n OMDs into a set G of communities (or groups), G = {1, 2. · · · , G}. Apparently, we
have |G| ≤ |R|.
In MH-CD2D networks, we assume that the total bandwidth in the system is TB, and let ωi be the total
bandwidth that MMD relay ri is willing to lease and let ni be the total number of OMDs that choose to
associate with MMD ri. We have TB ≥
∑
i ωi + IB, where IB is reserved bandwidth used for infrastructure
communications. Usually, ωi has an upper bound ω¯i, i.e., 0 ≤ ωi ≤ ω¯i, i ∈ R. Without loss of generality, we
9assume that OMDs in the same community are allocated with equal portion of bandwidth, which is ωi/ni.
Let ngi denote the number of OMDs in community g that is attached to relay ri, where g ∈ G. Then we have
ni =
∑
g n
g
i .
V. ANALYSIS ON JOINT BANDWIDTH-REPLAY ALLOCATION IN MH-CD2D NETWORKS
In this section, we model the joint bandwidth-relay allocation problem in MH-CD2D networks as a two-
stage Stackelberg game. In particular, for each OMD in the community, its aim is to determine which MMD
to attach. Since all the OMDs are selfish, they only concentrate on their own benefits from the MMD without
caring for others. As a result, multiple OMDs may choose the same relay to maximize their Quality of Service
(QoS) such as the throughput capacity, which may lead to network congestion due to simultaneous connections
at the same MMD. Besides, the spare spectrum resource offered by the other MMDs will be wasted. On the
other hand, from the perspective of the relay, serving more OMDs means more energy consumption at MMDs
and may lead to self performance degradation. To solve the above issues, we propose a market-based pricing
scheme. In this scheme, OMDs should pay for the cooperative relay service offered by MMDs. MMDs can get
monetary compensation for sharing resources as a reward. Because OMDs are allocated with the same portion
of bandwidth, we assume that each OMD is charged for the same price pri by the MMD ri it attaches to.
Let P = {pr1, pr2 , · · · , prm} denote the charging price vector by all MMDs. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, · · · , ωm} be the
bandwidth vector that the MMDs are willing to share. Then, the strategy profile for MMDs is (Ω,P). For relay
set R, the spare resources are sold to the OMDs for profits and the OMDs are buyers in the virtual market.
All users in the virtual market are selfish and they only care about their own profits. The MMDs may compete
with each other on the available bandwidth to offer with charging prices for OMDs. For the OMDs, each user
needs to determine which MMD to employ, based on the given resource and charging profile (Ω,P). Since
the OMDs are selfish, there are competitions between the users. Therefore, the competition behaviors can be
formulated as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the leaders are MMDs and the followers are OMDs.
We first describe the evolution dynamics of OMDs in subsection V-A. Then we analyze the competition
among MMDs in subsection V-B. Finally, we prove that the system will reach the Nash equilibrium in subsection
V-C.
A. Evolution Dynamics of OMDs
In an MH-CD2D network, we adopt Amplify-and-Forward (AF) cooperative communication [2]. Note that we
do not consider Decode-and-Forward (DF) cooperative communication since the relay node selection algorithm
designed for AF can be easily extended for DF as indicated in [2]. AF consists of two phrases, (Phase 1)
broadcasting and (Phase 2) relaying, which will be described in details as follows.
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Fig. 2. Demonstration of Cooperative D2D Communication
Let Si = {si1, si2, · · · , sini} denote the set of OMDs that choose MMD ri as cooperative relay node. Each
OMD sij ∈ Si, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ni} belongs to a group g ∈ G. Denote the destination node of source node sij
by dij . Fig. 2 shows an example, in which OMDs s11 and s12 both choose MMD r1 as cooperative relay in
group 1 while d23 is the destination node of s23 in group 2. We assume that one source node can only select
one MMD relay at one time due to the half-duplexity of wireless interface. For example, at one time slot, node
s can only be attached to r1, but at next time slot, it may choose r2 in group 2.
In Phase 1, source node sij broadcasts its information x to its destination node dij and its information
has been overheard by relay node ri. The received signals ysijdij and ysijri at OMD dij and MMD ri can be
expressed as,
ysijdij =
√
Psijhsijdijx+ ξsijdij , (1)
and
ysijri =
√
Psijhsijrix+ ξsijri , (2)
where Psij is the transmission power of source node sij , hsijdij is the channel power gain between source sij
and destination dij , hsijri is channel power gain between source sij and relay ri. ξsijdij and ξsijri are additive
white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) with zero mean and variance σ2. For direct D2D transmission between sij
and dij if relay ri is not used, the achievable capacity can be defined as
CD(sij, dij) =
ωi∑
g∈G n
g
i
log2(1 +
Psij |hsijdij |
2
σ2
), (3)
where SNRsijdij is
SNRsijdij =
Psij |hsijdij |
2
σ2
. (4)
In Phase 2, MMD ri amplifies the received signal ysijri and forwards it to OMD dij with power Pri . Then
received signal at dij is
yridij =
√
Prihridijxridij + ξridij , (5)
11
where ξridij is the received white Gaussian noise at dij in the second phase with zero mean and variance σ
2.
xridij is the normalization factor which is defined as
xridij =
ysijri
|ysijri|
. (6)
Combining (2), (5) and (6), we have
yridij =
√
Prihridij (
√
Psijhsijri + ξsijri)√
Psij |hsijri|
2 + σ2
+ ξridij . (7)
Using (7), the SNR for sij relayed by ri is given as follows
SNRsijridij =
PsijPri|hsijri |
2|hridij |
2
σ2(σ2 + Psij |hsijri |
2 + Pri|hridij |
2)
. (8)
Therefore, using (4) and (8) when maximal-ratio combining (MRC) is used at dij , the achievable capacity
through relay ri can be expressed as
CR(sij, ri, dij) =
ωi
2
∑
g∈G n
g
i
log2(1 + SNRsijdij + SNRsijridij ). (9)
It should be noted that, the channel related parameters in the above equations are maintained at the base
station and broadcast to mobile nodes via periodically control packets. We then define Relay Selection Condition
to determine whether a relay should be chosen.
Definition 1: Relay Selection Condition. For each source OMD sij , it may choose relay ri as the cooperative
node if the achievable capacity gain CR(sij, ri, dij)/CD(sij, dij) is greater than 1. Otherwise, it may choose
direct transmission without the relay or imitate other OMD’s choice within the same group to maximize the
utility, which is defined in (11).
Since OMDs in the same group can learn from each other’s choice via the broadcasting of MMD relay and
then dynamically adjust their strategies, the behaviors of players (OMDs) form the evolution in the group.
According to [41], for each member in group g, the sharing vector for relay ri can be defined as the fraction
of the spectrum offered by ri. Let Π
g be the state vector of the user in group g, thus
Π
g = {pig1 , pi
g
2, · · · , pi
g
m}, (10)
where each element pigi in Π
g represents the fraction of sharing for relay ri. Note that
∑
i pi
g
i = 1 and pi
g
i ≥ 0.
For example, let G = {1, 2}, m = 2, pi11 = 30%, pi
1
2 = 70% means in a system where there are two groups
and two MMDs, 30% members in group 1 choose relay r1 and 70% members in group 1 choose relay r2.
Combining (3) and (9), we can define the utility ugij of the jth source user sij renting relay ri as follows,
ugij = [αtij max{CR, CD} − pri]xij , (11)
where α is the unit cost per bit, tij is the time fraction that the jth source user sij can get access to relay ri
and is usually set as 1. It should be noted that xij equals to 1 if CR > CD and xij equals to 0, otherwise.
According to [41], the utility of OMD at time t is a function of the group state at time (t− τ) and τ is a time
delay variable. Here, we assume the OMDs within each group have similar distances to their corresponding
12
receivers. In this way, the sub index ‘j’ in (11) can be omitted. Similar to [15], we have the replicator dynamics
of the population (i.e., the OMDs in the group) as follows,
p˙ii
g(t) = δpigi (t)(u
g
i (t− τ)− u¯
g(t− τ)), (12)
where δ represents the updating speed based on the observation of OMDs, ugi stands for the utility of an OMD
in group g that attaches to MMD ri, and u¯
g is the average utility of a user in group g.
It is shown in (12) that the number of OMDs choosing MMD ri will increase if the payoff is higher than
the group’s average payoff. The evolution will end when the sharing strategy remains constant, which is the
evolutionary equilibrium.
B. Competition Between MMDs
When OMDs reach an equilibrium, MMDs will compete with each other to adjust their strategies which
is coordinated by the base station to maximize total utility. The behavior of MMDs can be modeled as a
non-cooperative game. The utility of one MMD is the total payment of all OMDs that attach to it minus its
cost for serving as a relay. Let Ui be the utility of the ith MMD relay ri, then we have
Ui = pri
∑
g∈G
ngi (Ω,P)− ciωi, (13)
where ci is the relay cost per unit bandwidth.
Definition 2: Define the profile strategies for all MMDs except relay ri as (Ω−i,P−i).
Definition 3: The strategy profile (Ω∗,P∗) is the Nash equilibrium if ∀i ∈ R, Ui(ω∗i ,Ω
∗
−i; p
∗
i ,P
∗
−i) ≥
Ui(ωi,Ω
∗
−i; pi,P
∗
−i) for ∀ωi ≥ 0, pi ≥ 0.
The Nash equilibrium can be found in solving the fixed point of all the best responses of players.
Definition 4: The optimal strategy for each MMD i is defined as
OPTi(Ω−i,P−i) = argmax
ωi,pi
Ui(ωi,Ω−i; pi,P−i). (14)
Next, we use a simple example to illustrate how the system evolves towards the Nash equilibrium.
C. Simple Example
We consider a simple example similar to [15], in which there are two MMDs R = {r1, r2}. Under this
setting, we will utilize backward induction to derive the Nash equilibrium.
1) Evolution Dynamics of OMDs: Assume that each OMD tells its utility truthfully, as illustrated in the
previous section, when p˙igi (t) = 0, the evolutionary game will converge to the equilibrium. The evolution will
end because no member in the group can enhance its utility by copying other’s strategy. Thus, we can solve
the following equation to determine the equilibrium,
ugi = u
g
j 6=i, ∀g ∈ G, (15)
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where the left hand side of (15) is the utility of an OMD member in group g that chooses MMD ri as relay
node, while the right hand side of (15) is the utility of OMD who chooses the other relays except relay ri.
Combining (3)(9)(11)(15), then (15) can be re-written as (16), where we assume that OMDs and MMDs are
ω1
n1
log2max(1 +
P |hs1d1 |
2
σ2
+
P 2|hs1r1 |
2|hr1d1 |
2
P |hs1r1 |
2σ2 + P |hr1d1 |
2σ2 + σ4
, 1 +
P |hs1d1 |
2
σ2
)− pr1
=
ω2
n2
log2max(1 +
P |hs2d2 |
2
σ2
+
P 2|hs2r2 |
2|hr2d2 |
2
P |hs2r2 |
2σ2 + P |hr2d2 |
2σ2 + σ4
, 1 +
P |hs2d2 |
2
σ2
)− pr2
(16)
A = max(1 +
P |hs1d1 |
2
σ2
+
P 2|hs1r1 |
2|hr1d1 |
2
P |hs1r1 |
2σ2 + P |hr1d1 |
2σ2 + σ4
, 1 +
P |hs1d1 |
2
σ2
) (17a)
B = max(1 +
P |hs2d2 |
2
σ2
+
P 2|hs2r2 |
2|hr2d2 |
2
P |hs2r2 |
2σ2 + P |hr2d2 |
2σ2 + σ4
, 1 +
P |hs2d2 |
2
σ2
) (17b)
assigned with same transmission power P and same noise at the receiver for the benefit of simplicity. That’s
because the different power consumptions can be modeled by the variant charging prices and costs. Regarding
to power control game in the fading channel, please refer to [42]. In group one, the channel gain between
source si and relay ri is denoted by hsi,ri , the channel gain between source si and destination di is denoted
by hsi,di , the channel gain between relay ri and destination di is denoted by hri,di where i ∈ {1, 2}. Let n
g be
the number of OMDs in g ∈ G, then ng =
∑
i∈R n
g
i and n
g
i = pi
g
i n
g. Therefore, (16) can be rewritten as,
DX2 − (ω1A+ ω2B + nD)X + ω1An = 0, (18)
where
X = n1 (19)
and A is defined in (17a), B is described in (17b). D and n are defined as follows,
D = pr1 − pr2, (20)
n =
∑
g
ng. (21)
Note that (19) is the positive solution of equation (18). As we can see from (16) ∼ (21), the term ωi/(
∑
g∈G n
g
i )
makes equations not easy to be handled. Note that the log(·) function is concave, ζlog(·), ζ > 0 is also concave.
To simplify the analysis, we modify the utility function of OMDs by re-defining CR and CD (see (3) and (9))
as follows,
CR(sij , ri, dij) = log2(
kωωi∑
g∈G n
g
i
τij), (22)
and
CD(sij, dij) = log2(
kωωi∑
g∈G n
g
i
bij), (23)
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where kω is a system parameter which originates from the coefficient of (3) or (9). Note that through this
change, we do not change the concave feature of the original equations (3) and (9), which is also adopted by
[43], thus we have
τij = 1 + SNRsijdij + SNRsijridij (24)
and
bij = 1 + SNRsijdij . (25)
As the same as previous equations (12)(16), the subindex ‘j’ can be omitted. Therefore, (15) can be re-written
as, ∑
g
pig1n
g =
n
1 + 2pr1−pr2 ω2Y2
ω1Y1
, (26)
where Y1=max{τ1, b1}, Y2=max{τ2, b2}. According to [16], the equilibrium can be determined by solving the
Jacobian matrix,
J =


∂δpi
(1)
1 (u
(1)
1 −u¯
(1))
∂pi
(1)
1
∂δpi
(1)
1 (u
(1)
1 −u¯
(1))
∂pi
(2)
1
∂δpi
(2)
1 (u
(2)
1 −u¯
(2))
∂pi
(1)
1
∂δpi
(2)
1 (u
(2)
1 −u¯
(2))
∂pi
(2)
1

 =

J1,1 J1,2
J2,1 J2,2

 , (27)
where δ is as same as that defined in (12). The two eigenvalues of J can be
λ(J) =
(J1,2 + J2,2)±
√
4J1,2J2,1 + (J1,1 − J2,2)2
2
. (28)
2) Pricing competition between two MMDs: When there are multiple MMDs in the system, they may compete
with each other in terms of price and bandwidth to sell to OMDs. In this paper, we consider the fixed bandwidth
sharing between MMD r1 and MMD r2. Therefore, MMDs form the non-cooperative sub-game. The strategy
of each MMD is the price charging for OMDs. The payoff of each MMD is the total payment by OMDs
minus the consumption for serving OMDs. In this example, the non-cooperative game between MMDs can be
defined as a tuple 〈R, (Pi)i∈R, (Ui)i∈R〉. Because the bandwidth sharing is fixed, the utility function of the ith
player, defined in (13) can be rewritten as,
Ui = pri ×
∑
g∈G
pigi n
g − ciωi, (29)
where the term
∑
g∈G pi
g
i n
g can be determined by (26), which is the equilibrium of the evolutionary game for
the OMDs. Substituting (26) into (29), we have
Ui = pri ×
n
1 + 2pri−prj
ωjYj
ωiYi
− ciωi, (30)
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where (30) shows the interaction between the MMD and OMD. The first derivative of Ui with respect to pri
is computed as
∂Ui
∂pri
=
nωiYi[ωiYi + (2
pri−prj )ωjYj − priωjYj2
pri−prj ln 2]
[ωiYi + (2
pri−prj )ωjYj]2
. (31)
Therefore, the optimal price for the MMD can be calculated by letting ∂Ui
∂pri
= 0. Then from (31), we have
p∗ri =
1
ln 2
+
ωiYi
ωjYj
2prj−pri . (32)
In order to obtain the expression of the optimal price pri , without loss of generality, we use the function
exp(·) to replace the function 2(·), then (32) can be rewritten as
p∗ri = Bi(prj) = 1 +W{
ωiYi
ωjYj
exp(prj−1)}, (33)
where W(·) is a Lambert-W function [44].
3) Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative game between two MMDs: According to (33), each MMD’s optimal
price increases with the growing of other MMD’s price. Therefore, this game is proved to be a supermodular
game [16] and there is Nash equilibrium in this game.
Theorem 1: There is a pure Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative game between MMDs.
Proof: A super-modular game must satisfy the following properties: Property 1) A strategy is a subset of
real set. Property 2) A utility has increasing difference in all sets of strategies. In the non-cooperative game,
the optimal strategy of player i, its price pri ∈ [0,+∞]. According to [16], property 1 can be easily verified.
For property 2, it can be verified through ∂
2Ui
∂pri∂prj
≥ 0. We can calculate ∂
2Ui
∂pri∂prj
as
∂2Ui
∂pri∂prj
=
∂Bi
∂prj
=
W (z)
z(1 +W(z))
, z = e(prj−1). (34)
Since z > 0, and also, we have
z =W(z)eW(z). (35)
hence, we have W > 0 because z > 0. Further, we have ∂
2Ui
∂pri∂prj
≥ 0. Therefore, the non-cooperative game is
a supermodular game with a Nash equilibrium.
It is worthy noting that, the channel conditions are known a priory at base stations and are broadcasted to
each mobile devices in the network via control packets. We then show that the non-cooperative game has a
unique Nash equilibrium, shown as follows.
Theorem 2: The above non-cooperative game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: According to Theorem 1, there is a Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative game between MMDs.
In this theorem, we prove that the Nash equilibrium is unique by showing the self-mapping function of the
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MMD’s best response function is a contraction. The self-mapping function is expressed as follows,
pri = Fi(pri) = Bi(Bj(pri)) = 1 +W

 epri−1
W
(
ωjYj
ωiYi
epri−1
)

 (36)
for i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i. To prove the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, it is equivalent to demonstrate the
self-mapping function is a contraction. We observe that the Jacobian matrix is
J =

 ∂2Fi∂p2ri ∂2Fi∂pri∂prj
∂2Fj
∂pri∂prj
∂2Fj
∂p2rj

 =

 0 ∂Bi∂prj
∂Bj
∂pri
0

 . (37)
Let λ be the largest absolute eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix J. Then we have
λ =
√
∂Bi
∂prj
×
∂Bj
∂pri
. (38)
The self-mapping function is a contraction if and only if λ < 1. According to (34), we have ∂Bi
∂prj
< 1 and
thus λ < 1 is established, which means the self-mapping function is a contraction. Therefore, the uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium for MMDs is proved.
VI. IMES: A DISTRIBBUTED IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, a distributed Incentive Mechanism for Efficient bandwidth relay Sharing in CD2D networks
(IMES) is proposed. The mechanism includes evolution among OMDs and price competition within MMDs.
For MMDs, they are leaders and make decisions on the price and bandwidth for OMDs through competition.
The objective is to maximize their own utilities. For OMDs, they are followers and only respond to the ask
price and bandwidth changes made by MMDs to maximize their own utilities.
A. Evolution Mechanism Among OMDs
In this subsection, an iterative mechanism is proposed for OMDs so that they converge to the equilibrium.
Each OMD in the group tries to maximize its own utility. A distributed algorithm is designed to execute at
each OMD. Within each group, OMDs can communicate with each other and share the information of the
other’s choice. The average utility sent by MMDs can be shared with members in each group. Each member in
the group can change the decision with a probability if observing the other member within the group obtains a
higher utility. The evolution will end when all OMDs in the same group achieve equal or almost equal utility.
The details of the procedure are illustrated as follows. Firstly, each OMD in the group is attached to a MMD
relay node randomly. Then, each MMD computes its utility by using the allocated bandwidth and the price
charged by the corresponding MMD from (11). After exchanging information with users in the same group,
each OMD will get the information of utility and choice to compute the group’s average utility according to
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the following equation [43],
u¯g(t) =
∑
i u
g
i (t− 1)n
g
i (t− 1)
ng(t− 1)
. (39)
The OMD will change its link to the MMD if it finds another MMD can provide a higher utility when the
probability ψ(t) is higher than the random number within [0, 1], where ψ(t) is defined as [15]
ψ(t) =
u¯g(t)− ugi (t)
u¯g(t)
. (40)
The OMDs will repeat those procedures until the evolution is stable. The details of the scheme executed on
each OMD are shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Function DAO( ): Distributed Algorithm on each OMD
1: For all OMDs, the ith MMD ri is randomly chosen.
2: flag = true;
3: while flag do
4: A OMD computes the utility ugij from the obtained price and bandwidth using (11). The utility is then
shared within the group g.
5: Receive the choices and utility of the other users within the same group and computes the average utility
u¯g(t) in group g using (39).
6: if (ugi (t) < u¯
g(t)) then
7: Leave the current link to relay if rand < ψ(t).
8: else
9: Remain the current link to current relay MMD node
10: end if
11: if All OMDs within the same group have the same utility then
12: flag = false;
13: end if
14: end while
Algorithm 2 Function DAM( ): Distributed Algorithm on each MMD
1: For each MMD:
2: Initialize the bandwidth that MMD ri is willing to share ωi,0, charging price pri,0 .
3: while (ωi and pri are not stable) do
4: Wait for an interval T for the evolution among OMDs by executing Function DAO( )
5: ωi(t+ 1) = min{max{ωi,0(t + 1), 0}, 50} // Update the bandwidth
6: pri(t+ 1) = max{pri,0(t + 1), 0} // Update the price
7: t=t+1
8: end while
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TABLE II. Default simulation parameters
Parameters for Simulation Values
G, the set of social groups with OMDs {a, b}
R, the set of MMD relays {r1, r2}
τ , time delay parameter 1
T , waiting time 100ms
δ, updating speed parameter 1
na, the number of OMDs in group a 10
r, the communication range of devices 50m
nb, the number of OMDs in group b 30
Default network area size 100m× 100m
α, system parameter 1
B. Competition implementation for MMDs
In real scenarios, the multi-homing base stations are heterogeneous, a central controller to inform MMDs
may not be always available. Therefore, each MMD may learn and make its own decision to adapt to changes.
Under this setting, an iterative based updating scheme is proposed. Similar to [15], the MMD can update
strategies as follows,
ωi,0(t+ 1) = ωi(t) + µi,ω
Ui(ω(t),p(t)) − Ui(ω(t−∆t),p(t−∆t))
∆t
, (41)
and
pri,0(t+ 1) = pri(t) + µi,p
Ui(ω(t),p(t)) − Ui(ω(t−∆t),p(t−∆t))
∆t
, (42)
where ∆t is a period of time and µi,ω, µi,p are updating speed related parameters. When the offered bandwidth
and charging price are updated, they will be broadcast to OMDs within the group. After receiving those data,
each OMD will adjust their own strategies. As same as [43], due to the unknown evolution time, we also denote
a waiting time T for the strategy updating interval. When the results in (41) and (42) are stable, then the Nash
equilibrium is achieved by approximation. Details of the algorithm on the MMD is shown in Algorithm 2.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
According to [45], due to the price simultaneously charged by MMDs, there is no optimal strategy for each
OMD. Therefore, the equilibrium performance is studied. In this section, we first evaluate the performance of
the proposed game theoretic scheme in Section VII-B. We then analyze the service delay in Section VII-C.
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A. Experimental Setup
The experimental evaluation has been conducted on Matlab simulator [46]. To evaluate the performance of
proposed group behavior of users in neighboring groups as most studies do [47] [48], by default we assume
that there are two groups of OMDs randomly distributed in a 100m× 100m area [49] and competing for two
MMDs. As did in [50], we consider small groups by setting the default number of OMDs in group a as 10
while the default number of OMDs in group b is 30 . During the simulation, nodes may stay static or do not
frequently move [35] in the network. For example, in a wireless local area network covering a metropolitan
area [51], users may only move around in a restricted area close to their homes, including the office [52],
gymnasiums, and so on. As another example, defending soldiers are allowed to move in their defend areas
on the battlefield [39]. The communication range is set as 50m for mobile devices [53] and the waiting time
interval is set as 100ms.
We then set system parameters for group a. In particular, the channel gain between source and relay is
hs1r1 = 0.3, the channel gain between source and destination is hs1d1 = 0.25 and the channel gain between
relay and destination is hr1d1 = 0.4 [54]. Similarly, we set system parameters for group b as hs2r2 = 0.25,
hr2d2 = 0.35 and hs2d2 = 0.21. Here we adopt the same channel gain of elements in each group to simplify the
analysis just the same as in [55] and [56], which does not affect the performance comparison for the proposed
scheme. We choose the common transmission power as P = 2W [57] [58] for group a and group b. Without
loss of generality, we set tij = 1s [59]. The results are obtained by averaging over 1000 simulation runs. Table
II lists the parameters used in simulations. The behaviors of OMDs in one group are compared with those of
OMDs in the other group on choosing MMD relay nodes when Algorithms 1 and 2 are executed. The best
strategy of one MMD with respect to the behavior of other MMD is also studied. To evaluate service delay,
we design a randomized method to compare with the proposed IMES. When there are more than two groups,
i.e. |R| ≥ 3, there are two cases since in the simulation we set |G| = |R|.
Case 1: The number of MMDs is odd. In this case, the algorithms will be executed between adjacent groups
and neighboring MMDs. Finally three groups of OMDs and three MMDs are left. Then we can divide one
group of OMD users in the last three groups into two separate subgroups uniformly, and then duplicate the
role of one MMD for the separated two groups by choosing one MMD from the last three MMDs.
Case 2: The number of MMDs is even. As same as Case I, the algorithms will be executed between
neighboring OMD groups with the corresponding MMDs.
20
B. Best Strategy
Firstly, we analyze the phase plane of replicator dynamics, as shown in Fig. 3. Although there are multi-
rounds for the replicator dynamics, we only consider a particular round given the offered resources and charging
prices. We assume that all OMDs can perform cooperative communications with MMD r1. In this simulation,
ω1 = 20, ω2 = 40, n
a = 10 and nb = 30. For the charging price, we set pr1 = 1 and pr2 = 2. The proportions of
OMDs in group a and b choosing the MMD relay r1 are plotted in Fig. 3. The phase plane shows the evolution
direction of the replicator dynamics towards the Nash equilibrium. It is shown in Fig. 3 that whatever the
starting point is, the population of OMDs converges to different evolutionary equilibria. The solid line in Fig.3
shows the set of Nash equilibria. For example, from (pia1 , pi
b
1) = (0.56, 0.21), the equilibrium will be achieved
at (pia1 , pi
b
1) = (0.84, 0.51). It is worth noting that in the equilibrium, the utility of OMDs in a is almost equal
to that in b.
Further more, the basin of attraction consists of the replicator dynamics is the whole feasible region, that
is 0 < pia1 , pi
b
1 < 1. Fig. 4 shows the convergence of the evolution of total utility in each group towards the
equilibrium (pia1 , pi
b
1) = (0.84, 0.65) from the starting point (0.73, 0.50). In this experiment, we assume that both
r1 and r2 offer the same bandwidth of ω1 = ω2 = 25. Both n
a and nb are equal to 30. In the equilibrium, the
utility of all OMDs in each group is close to the theoretical utility based on the observed value. In order to
clearly present the results, we adjust the results of total utility divided by 100, as shown in Fig. 4. It is observed
that the total utility of group a is higher than group b when the equilibrium is achieved. That’s because (i) the
channel gains that result in the total utility for OMDs in group a are higher than those in group b and (ii) the
ask price of r1 is lower than that of r2. Next, we investigate the number of OMDs that attach to MMD r1
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Fig. 3. Phase plane of replication dynamics when ω1 = 20, ω2 = 40, n
a = 10 and nb = 30
with changing number of OMDs in group b. As shown in Fig. 5(a), with increasing number of OMDs nb, the
number of OMDs choosing MMD r1 grows accordingly. When the charging price of r2, i.e. pr2 grows from
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0.5 to 2.0, n1 increases due to the intention to choose a service provider with lower price. Further more, we
study the relationship between n1 and n
b when MMDs r1 and r2 charge the same price at the evolutionary
equilibrium. Let pr1 = pr2 = 1.0, ω1 is fixed at 30, as shown in Fig. 5(b), when total number of OMDs in
group b is constant, n1 decreases with the increase of ω2. That’s because when the more bandwidth is offered
by r2, the less number of OMDs will choose r1.
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Fig. 5. (a) Relationship between n1 and n
b with varying pr2 when ω1 = ω2 = 30 and n
a = 25 at equilibrium; (b) Relationship
between n1 and n
b with varying pr2 when ω1 = 30 and n
a = nb = 25 at equilibrium; (c) Best responses of the two MMDs for the
pricing strategy; (d) Best strategies of two MMDs with different charging prices.
Fig. 5(c) shows the best responses of the pricing strategy of the two MMD relays. In this experiment, MMD
r1 offers a bandwidth of ω1 = 20 and MMD r2 offers a bandwidth of ω2 = 40. It is observed that both the
best response strategy of r1 and the best response strategy of r2 grow in the Stackelberg game. Furthermore,
for MMD r2, the slope of the best response value is greater than 1 whereas it is not the case for MMD r2.
That’s because r2 offers more bandwidth than r1 does. The Nash equilibrium point is achieved when the best
price strategy is (p∗r1 , p
∗
r2
) = (1.8112, 2.2341). To earn more profits, MMD r1 should lease more bandwidth to
OMDs.
To better demonstrate the MMD’s best response with its counterpart’s changing bandwidth and charging price,
we compare the performance when the two-variable strategy profile (Ω,P) is considered. In this example, we
firstly fix the charging price of MMDs and derive the optimal bandwidth available to offer by MMDs. In this
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experiment, µi.ω = 1, µi,p = 0.5 and ∆t = 1. As shown in Fig. 5(d), the charging prices are equal. When one
MMD increases its offered bandwidth, more OMDs will choose it as their common resource provider while its
counterpart will reduce the offered bandwidth to guarantee the utility of itself according to (29). Accordingly,
the OMDs will reach to the equilibrium following the similar phase plane of replication dynamics as shown
in Fig. 3. The Nash equilibrium can be achieved when both of the MMDs play their own best strategies with
equal price. For example, when pr1 = pr2 = 1.0, the equilibrium is at (ω
∗
1, ω
∗
2) = (23.793, 23.793). It can also
be drawn from Fig. 5(d) that when the charging prices increase, the best strategy for each MMD is to offer
more bandwidth for OMDs so that it can gain more profits.
Fig. 6(a) examines the utility of MMDs with the increasing number of OMDs in group a. When the bandwidth
ω2 is fixed at ω2 = 20, the utilities of both MMDs increase when ω1 drops from 30 to 20. That’s because when
ω1 becomes smaller, a lower price will be at the equilibrium, which can attract more OMDs (as previously
explained of Fig. 5(d)). We have the similar findings when ω2 is fixed at ω2 = 30 as shown in Fig. 6(a).
Next, we analyze the relationship between net utility of MMDs and the number of OMDs in group a. Let
c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.1, n
b = 30. Generally, the utility of MMDs grows with the number of OMDs in group a. For
MMD r1, when ω1 = 30 and n
a is fixed, with ω2 decreasing from 30 to 20, the utility of MMD r1 increases
because there are more OMDs choose to switch from r2 to r1 due to more resource offerings by r1. In Fig.
6(b), when cooperative communication is adopted, the MMD acts not only as the bandwidth seller, but also acts
as the intermediate relay, which differentiates the final utility function of MMDs. Take Fig. 6(b) as an example
again. When there are only 90% OMDs conducting cooperative communication (CC) with MMD r1 in group
a, the utility difference between r1 and r2 is larger than that of all nodes using cooperative communications,
that can be explained by the changing values of kωτij in (22).
To study the influence of more than two MMDs with constant number of OMDs, we modify the algorithm
CDARA [18] so that it can fit for the case of only one kind of resource demands of buyers. We compare the
proposed IMES with the modified CDARA scheme. Each newly added MMD has the initial bandwidth of 40
and prj = 0.2, where j > 2. The valuation of each OMD with CDARA scheme is calculated by their original
position and the two groups can be divided into multiple sub-groups with each MMD acts as the group leader.
As shown in Fig. 6(c), with the growing number of MMDs, the total utility of MMDs grows first and decreases
fast when the number of MMDs is larger than 5 and finally reaches to zero utility. That’s because the more
MMD relays, the more user demands can be satisfied. However, when the number of MMD relays reaches to
the limit of 5, the limited number of OMD users in one single sub-group cannot afford the MMD relay, thus
the total utility will decrease and finally reaches to zero utility. On average, IMES outperforms the CDARA
scheme by about 20.37%.
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Fig. 6. (a) MMD’s total utility with the number of OMDs in group a, na at evolutionary equilibrium; (b) MMD’s total utility with
the number of OMDs in group a, na at evolutionary equilibrium with changing proportion of cooperative communication pairs; (c)
Utility of MMDs with the number of MMDs; (d) An example of network topologies in a plane of 100m× 100m.
C. Service Delay
To study service delay, we compare our proposed incentive based method IMES with a randomized method
(named as Rand). Regarding to Rand, an OMD randomly selects one of the MMDs for CD2D communication
if CD2D communication is better than direct D2D communication. With regard to our proposed IMES, details
can be found in Section VI.
We first consider an example network in a square area of 100m×100m, as shown in Fig. 6(d), where the left-
pointing triangle represents source OMD and the right-pointing triangle stands for destination OMD. During
the simulation, MMDs always have extra bandwidth that can be shared with OMDs. If an OMD cannot finish
the transmission in the current round of TDMA slots, it will be served within the following rounds. Therefore,
we define the service delay as the average transmission time when an OMD finishes sending messages to its
destination.
We exam the impact of both the number of OMDs and the number of MMDs on service dealy. Fig. 7(a)
shows the average service delay versus the number of OMDs when the number of MMDs is fixed at |R| = 3.
It is shown in Fig. 7(a) that the average service delay increases with increased number of OMDs in both
IMES and Rand schemes. That’s because more OMDs cause higher traffic loads, which results in the higher
service delay. Besides, Fig. 7(a) also shows that our proposed IMES always has lower service delay than Rand
scheme, implying the effectiveness of our IMES. On average, IMES is more than 25% times better than the
randomized method. Moreover, when the number of OMDs is fixed, the average service delay drops quickly
with the increased bandwidth. For example, when there are 120 OMDs, the available bandwidth is ω = 20,
the average delay is about 200 for Rand scheme and 150 for IMES while the delay is only 100 for the random
method and 75 for IMES. This observation implies that increasing the bandwidth can significantly reduce the
service delay.
Fig. 7(b) shows the relationship between the number of MMDs and the average service delay. We fix the
number of OMDs at 50 in the network. It is shown in Fig. 7(b) that the average service delay decreases fast
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Fig. 7. Performance of average delay
with the increased number of MMDs when the number of MMDs is below 8, implying that increasing the
number of MMDs can significantly reduce the service delay. However, the average service delay reaches a
constant value when the number of MMDs is greater than 8. That is because the number of OMDs served by
each MMD reaches a saturated value with the fixed bandwidth, implying that adding more MMDs will not
bring any benefits in this case. Besides, it is also shown in Fig. 7(b) that our proposed IMES always has lower
average service delay than the Rand. On average, IMES is about 32.8% better than Rand when the available
bandwidth for each MMD is ω = 40. When ω = 20, the delay reduction gain is about 36.7%.
The results in both Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) are based on a network with the fixed area 100m×100m. We next
investigate the impacts of network area on the service delay. In the second set of simulations, we increase the
network area from 100m×100m to 200m×200m. Note that we fix the number of OMDs at 40 and the number
of MMDs at 8. It is shown in Fig. 7(c) that the average service delay decreases with the increasing of network
area. That’s because the traffic congestion is alleviated when network becomes sparse. Besides, our proposed
IMES can reduce average service delay by at least 20% compared with Rand scheme with consideration of
network area size influence.
We then conduct another set of simulations to investigate impacts of the number of MMDs with consideration
of the changing network area size. In particular, we deploy 60 OMDs in the network. It is shown in Fig. 7(d)
that increasing the number of MMDs can greatly decrease the average service delay, implying that a better
QoS is achieved with the growth of MMDs.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel multi-homing cooperative D2D network, by combining the ordinary
mobile devices and multi-homing mobile devices. We have contributed a two-level evolutionary game for such
MH-CD2D networks, to deal with one of the challenges of the network, i.e., the joint bandwidth relay allocation
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problem. We have provided analysis for the procedure to select the best MMDs utilizing the replica dynamics.
We have also proposed algorithms to maximize the utilities of the OMDs by introducing price competitions into
the scheme, instead of keeping the price unchanged in the traditional auction mechanisms. Moreover, we have
investigated the existences of the evolutionary equilibrium in the proposed MH-CD2D networks. Extensive
simulation results demonstrate that the equilibrium can be achieved and the best response price of one MMD
increases with the best price of the other MMD in the Stackelberg game. The utility of MMDs increases with
the number of OMDs in each OMD group at the evolutionary equilibrium. For service delay, we take the
influence of network area into consideration. Following the most existing works, we compare our algorithms
with the randomized scheme. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme IMES is able to improve
the randomized scheme by more than 25% in terms of service delay. With IMES, the utilities of MMDs and
OMDs can be enhanced. Meanwhile, the fairness of OMD within the same group and between different groups
can be ensured. When the prices of both MMDs increase towards the equilibrium (shown in Fig. 5(c)), the
two MMDs tend to offer more bandwidth for OMDs (shown in Fig. 5(d)). Therefore, IMES has shown its
advantage to motivate bandwidth sharing as well as to ensure fairness.
Our future work includes addressing the problem when OMD users move between different macro-cells or
small cells. We also plan to investigate the case when one MMD node can serve multiple OMDs and one
OMD can compete for multiple MMDs. In addition, our future work also covers interference control between
neighboring MMDs and the study for general cases with different mobility models.
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